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Abstract:Yuri Balashov has argued that endurantism is untenable in the context of Minkowski 
spacetime. Balashov’s argument runs through two main theses concerning the relation of 
coexistence, or temporal co-location. (1) Coexistence must turn out to be an absolute or objective 
matter; and in Minkowski spacetime coexistence must be grounded in the relation of spacelike 
separation. (2) If endurantism is true, then (1) leads to absurd conclusions; but if perdurantism is 
true, then (1) is harmless. I object to both theses. Against (1), I argue that coexistence is better 
construed as being relative to a hyperplane of simultaneity. Against (2), I argue that the 
consequences of (1) given endurantism are no worse than the consequences of (1) given 
perdurantism.      
 
 
1. Introduction 
Endurantism (or three-dimensionalism) is the view that material objects are temporally unextended 
‘continuants’ that persist through time by being wholly present at each moment of their careers. 
The opposing view, perdurantism (or four-dimensionalism), states that persisting material objects 
are temporally extended ‘space-time worms’ composed of different temporal parts existing at 
different times.  
A number of philosophers have claimed that the special theory of relativity (SR), if true, 
would render endurantism untenable.1 Yuri Balashov (2000b, 2000c) has recently proposed an 
interesting, detailed, and entirely original argument for this claim.2 Balashov’s argument centers 
around the notion of coexistence. Balashov attempts to show that while both endurantists and 
perdurantists can produce viable accounts of coexistence in the pre-relativistic context of neo-
Newtonian spacetime, only perdurantists can produce such an account in the relativistic context of 
Minkowski spacetime. 
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In this paper I argue that there are at least two (and perhaps three) fatal flaws in Balashov’s 
case for the incompatibility of SR and endurantism. I reconstruct his argument in §2 and criticize it 
in §§3-5.  
 
2. Balashov’s Argument 
Balashov’s argument is conducted under the idealizing assumption that all material objects are 
spatially unextended, hence that their paths through spacetime can be represented as one-
dimensional worldlines rather than as four-dimensional worldtubes. This assumption allows him to 
formulate endurantism and perdurantism in spatiotemporal terms, roughly as follows: 3 
Endurantism: For any material object O, each point on O’s worldline exactly contains 
the whole of O. In other words, each material object is wholly present at 
each point on its worldline. 
 
Perdurantism: For any material object O, (i) O is wholly present at exactly one region – 
namely, O’s entire worldline, (ii) each point on O’s worldline exactly 
contains the whole of some material object that is a (spatio-) temporal part 
of O, and (iii) no two points on O’s worldline exactly contain the whole of 
the same temporal part of O. 
 
Henceforth I shall adopt these formulations and the assumption that permits them. I shall also 
follow Balashov in assuming that SR entails that spacetime is Minkowskian.  
Balashov offers his argument for the incompatibility of SR and endurantism as an 
alternative to the following, older route to the same conclusion. 
P1 SR rules out presentism, the view that only present entities exist, and entails 
eternalism, the view that past, present, and future entities are all equally in 
existence.4 
 P2 But eternalism rules out endurantism.5 
 C Therefore SR rules out endurantism. 
  
Like many other philosophers, Balashov accepts P1 and rejects P2. He assumes that SR entails both 
eternalism and the tenseless (or static or B-) theory of time,6 but he denies that these consequences 
of SR force us to abandon endurantism.7, 8  
Turning now to Balashov’s alternative argument, we can reconstruct it in skeletal form as 
follows:  
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Premise 1: Minkowski spacetime, its inhabitants, and their arrangement.  The end of 
Aristotle’s worldline lies within the absolute past of the beginning of Clinton’s worldline. 
However, there is some persisting object, call it Bob, whose worldline contains a point, call 
it pB, that is spacelike separated both from the final points on Aristotle’s worldline and 
from the initial points on Clinton’s worldline. These are facts that both endurantists and 
perdurantists must accept. (e.g., 2000b: 156, 2000c: S560) 
Balashov’s goal is to show that the type of situation described in Premise 1 gives rise to absurd 
consequences just in case endurantism is true. (According to Balashov, the situations in question 
need not involve sentient beings; fundamental particles will do just as well (2000b: 164).) If he 
achieves this goal, he will have provided Minkowskians with a compelling reason to reject 
endurantism.  
Premise 2: Coexistence As Spacelike Separation (CASS). In the context of Minkowski 
spacetime, the relation of coexistence between material objects must be grounded in the 
relation of spacelike separation between spacetime points. This guiding idea must be 
accepted by endurantists and perdurantist alike. In the hands of the perdurantist, the 
guiding idea leads to the following accounts:  
(CP)  Perduring object O coexists with (bears CP to) perduring object 
O* iff there is a momentary (spatio-) temporal part of O, P, and a 
momentary temporal part of O*, P*, such that the spacetime point 
occupied by P is spacelike separated from the spacetime point 
occupied by P*.9  
 
(CP*) Momentary temporal part P coexists with (bears CP* to) 
momentary temporal part P* iff the spacetime point occupied by P 
is spacelike separated from the spacetime point occupied by P*.10 
 
(Coexistence-P*)  Perduring object O coexists with (coexists-P* with) momentary 
temporal part P* iff there is a momentary temporal part of O, P, 
such that the spacetime point occupied by P is spacelike separated 
from the spacetime point occupied by P*.11 
 
In the hands of the endurantist, the guiding idea leads to (CE*) and (Coexistence*): 
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(CE*) Enduring object O, wholly present at point p on its worldline, 
coexists with (bears CE* to) enduring object O*, wholly present at 
point p* on its worldline iff p is spacelike separated from p*.12 
 
(Coexistence*)    Enduring object O, considered in abstraction from any of its 
locations, coexists* with enduring object O* wholly present at 
point p* on O*’s worldline iff there is some point p on O’s 
worldline such that p* and p are spacelike separated.13 
  
From Premises 1 and 2 it follows that the occupant of point pB coexists with both Aristotle and 
Clinton. (If endurantism is true, then the occupant of pB is Bob himself. If perdurantism is true, 
then the occupant of pB is a momentary temporal part of Bob. Either way, the occupant of pB 
coexists with both of the two men in question.) 
Premise 3: The Asymmetry Thesis. Unlike the perdurantist who accepts Premises 1 and 
2, the endurantist who accepts these premises is committed to claims the following form:  
STILL The end of object OA’s worldline lies within the absolute past of the 
beginning of object OC’s worldline; hence OA and OC never coexist with 
each other. But for object OB at point p, there is a sense in which both OA 
and OC are still or already in existence. (2000b: 155, 2000c: S560-S561) 
 
Premise 4: The Absurdity Thesis. All claims of form STILL are absurd. (2000b: 158, 
2000c: S561) 
Conclusion. Endurantists have unacceptable commitments, commitments that can be 
avoided by rejecting endurantism in favor of perdurantism.    
Balashov devotes the bulk of his energy to the task of defending CASS and the Asymmetry Thesis 
(as I shall call them). Accordingly, these two theses will be the main targets of my criticism. In §4 I 
focus on the Asymmetry Thesis, and in §5 I focus on CASS. Although Balashov’s conclusion 
could be blocked by rejecting either thesis, I conclude that both are false. Before turning to these 
matters, however, I would like to say a few words about the Absurdity Thesis. 
 
3. The Absurdity Thesis 
Here is a claim of form STILL: Despite the fact that Aristotle and Clinton never coexist with each 
other, there is a sense in which they are both still or already in existence for Bob at point pB. 
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According to the Absurdity Thesis, all such claims are absurd or, in Balashov’s words, “outrightly 
contradictory”. (2000b: 158) In what way are such claims contradictory? Balashov explains: 
A contradiction arises there because the causal and chronological succession of [Aristotle]’s end and 
[Clinton]’s beginning is in conflict with tensed determinations of being already in existence and 
being still in existence ascribed, respectively, to [Clinton] and [Aristotle] by an outside enduring 
observer [i.e., by Bob]. (2000b: 164) 
 
Apparently the idea is this. Suppose that the given claim is true. Then, on the one hand, Aristotle 
and Clinton never coexist; they are non-contemporaries. Call this the separateness claim. But, on 
the other hand, there is a sense in which they are both still or already in existence for Bob at point 
pB. In other words, Aristotle and Clinton are both ‘temporally here’ for Bob at pB. Call this the 
togetherness claim. Evidently Balashov takes the togetherness claim to entail that Aristotle and 
Clinton do coexist, hence to entail that the separateness claim is false. Thus Balashov seems to be 
presupposing14: 
(3.1) If there is a sense in which both OA and OC are still or already in existence (if there 
is a sense in which they are both ‘temporally here’) for OB at point p, then OA and 
OC coexist. 
 
If (3.1) is true, then all claims of form STILL are false, and Balashov’s Absurdity Thesis stands 
vindicated. Is (3.1) true?  
I concede that this principle has a great deal of plausibility, at least from a naive, intuitive 
standpoint. It seems to me, however, that (3.1) would lose much of its plausibility when considered 
from the standpoint of someone who accepted CASS. The advocate of CASS holds that 
coexistence is grounded in spacelike separation, hence that it is possible for a thing (e.g., Bob) to 
coexist at a single moment of its career with both of two other things (e.g., Aristotle and Clinton) 
that never coexist with each other. This in itself involves a radical departure from our naive, 
intuitive ideas about coexistence. But according to Balashov, this is a departure that we all must 
make, regardless of whether we are endurantists or perdurantists.  
Once this departure is made, however, there seems to be no compelling reason to retain our 
allegiance to (3.1). Suppose, for example, that Bob is wholly present at point pB. Then, as an 
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advocate of CASS, he would be forced to say, “Since Aristotle and Clinton both intersect my 
topological present,15 they both coexist with me.” Having said this, surely he could go on to say, 
“Since they both coexist with me, there is at least some weak sense in which they are both still or 
already in existence from my perspective. But, contrary to principle (3.1), this last conclusion has 
no troubling consequences; it is perfectly consistent with the fact that Aristotle’s death lies within 
the absolute past of Clinton’s birth, hence that Aristotle and Clinton never coexist with each other.”  
The point is clear. If I am willing broaden my ideas about coexistence so as to allow for the 
possibility that I now coexist with both of two things that never coexist with each other, then I 
should also be willing to broaden my ideas associated with the phrase ‘are still or already in 
existence for me’: I should then be willing to broaden these latter ideas so as to allow for the 
possibility that there is at least some weak sense in which the given phrase can apply to both of two 
things that never coexist with each other. I submit that anyone who accepts Premises 1 – 3 is free to 
resist Balashov’s anti-endurantist Conclusion by rejecting Premise 4, the Absurdity Thesis. This 
matters little, however, since no one should accept Premises 2 or 3.       
 
4. The Asymmetry Thesis 
In this section I address the considerations that Balashov adduces in support of the Asymmetry 
Thesis. I conclude, first, that Balashov gives us no good reason to accept that thesis and, second, 
that in the absence of such reasons, we ought to reject the thesis.  
The Asymmetry Thesis posits an asymmetry between endurantism and perdurantism. It 
says: Unlike the perdurantist who accepts Premises 1 and 2, the endurantist who accepts these 
premises is committed to claims of the form  
STILL The end of object OA’s worldline lies within the absolute past of the 
beginning of object OC’s worldline; hence OA and OC never coexist with 
each other. But for object OB at point p, there is a sense in which both OA 
and OC are still or already in existence. 
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But why should we think that there is such an asymmetry between the two views? Balashov seems 
to offer two answers to this question. His first answer runs as follows: 
If I am an enduring object fully present at a particular [point on my worldline], there is a sense in 
which some other transient enduring objects exist no longer (Sakharov) or not yet (Gorbachev’s 
great-grandson) – because they do not bear the relation of Coexistence* to me-now, whereas yet 
others are still or already in existence (Gorbachev) – because they do coexist* with me-now. . . . 
[T]he important distinction between things that are (from the point of view of any enduring object at 
any point of its spatio-temporal career) still or already in existence and those that are not (any longer 
or yet) has a firm grounding in the invariant structure of Minkowski spacetime.  
But why should this distinction be regarded as being all-important to the endurantist? . . . . 
The answer, briefly, is that the endurantist must be committed to this distinction in virtue of the 
basic principle of her ontology, that an enduring object is fully present at any point of its spatio-
temporal career (i.e. its worldline)[my emphasis]. (2000b: 150-151, Balashov’s emphasis except 
where noted) 
  
If I am a perduring object . . . there is no sense in which some other perduring objects are ‘still’ in 
existence and yet others are ‘no longer’ (or ‘not yet’). . . .  If I am a perduring object, I am never 
fully present at any one point of my worldline. At any such point, I am present only partially, and 
being only partially present there does not entitle me to certain [temporally-loaded] determinations, 
as regards the existence of other objects and their coexistence with me, that being fully present does 
[my emphasis]. Among my parts, I have the 27 October 1987 one and the 27 October 1997 one. But 
none of them represents my point of view in a way in which being fully present on 27 October 1987 
or 27 October 1997 does. (2000b: 153, Balashov’s emphasis except where noted) 
 
Balashov’s thought here seems to be this. If Bob (e.g.) is not wholly present at point pB, then pB 
does not represent Bob’s perspective on the universe, and it would therefore be incorrect to say that 
certain other objects still or already exist from Bob’s perspective at pB. If, on the other hand, Bob is 
wholly present at pB, then pB does represent his perspective on the universe, and it would be correct 
to draw conclusions about what still or already exists for him at pB. In particular, we could then 
conclude that anything that coexists with Bob at pB is still or already in existence for him at pB. 
More generally:   
(4.1) For object O at point p, there is a sense in which both object O* and object O** 
are still or already in existence iff (i) O is wholly present at p, and (ii) O coexists 
at p with O* and O**. 
 
Balashov can then move from (4.1) to the Asymmetry Thesis via the following line of reasoning. 
Suppose that Premises 1 and 2 are true. Suppose also that endurantism is true. Then Bob is wholly 
present at pB, and Bob coexists at pB with both Aristotle and Clinton. Together with (4.1), this 
commits us to a conclusion of form STILL: Aristotle and Clinton are still or already in existence 
for Bob at pB, and this despite the fact that Aristotle’s death lies within the absolute past of 
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Clinton’s birth. Thus it seems that if Premises 1 and 2 are true, endurantists will be committed to 
claims of form STILL.  
Now suppose instead that perdurantism is true. Then, as a perduring object, Bob is not 
wholly present at pB. Together with (4.1), this entails that it would be incorrect to say that Aristotle 
and Clinton are still or already in existence for Bob at pB. Thus it may seem that perdurantists 
manage to avoid a commitment to claims of form STILL, hence that the desired asymmetry 
between endurantism and perdurantism has been established. 
 The problem with this line of reasoning is easy to see. Suppose again that Premises 1 and 
2, principle (4.1), and perdurantism are all true. Then, although Bob is not wholly present at pB, 
there is a temporal part of Bob that is wholly present at pB. Call this temporal part Jim. Since Jim is 
wholly present at pB, and since Jim coexists at pB with both Aristotle and Clinton, we are once 
again committed to a conclusion of form STILL: Aristotle and Clinton are both still or already in 
existence for Jim at pB, and this despite the fact that Aristotle’s death lies within the absolute past 
of Clinton’s birth. Therefore, if (4.1) is true, and if Premises 1 and 2 are also true, then 
perdurantists are committed to claims of form STILL.  
The lesson is plain. Far from supporting the relevant asymmetry between endurantists and 
perdurantists, (4.1) would completely abolish that asymmetry. I conclude that Balashov’s first 
argument for the Asymmetry Thesis is unsuccessful. 
In the passages below, Balashov seems to suggest a second argument: 
Yet another way to bring out the same point [that was brought out in the passages quoted above] is 
to note that all the perdurantist principles of coexistence examined in this paper (i.e. CP, CP*, and 
Coexistence-P*) define coexistence as a relation holding between entities that do not change their 
position in space-time. Consequently, the question of the coexistence of total four-dimensional 
objects (as in CP), or of their parts (as in CP*), or of one total object with a part of another (as in 
Coexistence-P*) presupposes that all such entities exist atemporally at their spatio-temporal 
locations. (2000b: 153) 
 
The coexistence relation governed by CE (and by other endurantist principles considered in this 
paper) is temporally-loaded . . . because it holds between entities that change their position in space-
time and, consequently, coexistence itself becomes a function of time. . . . In the relativistic 
framework, Newtonian time has to be replaced by proper time measured in the rest frame of a 
particular object. Instead of saying that x coexists with y at t, we say that x, when it is wholly present 
at some moment of its proper time tx, coexists with y, when it is wholly present at ty. (2000b: 162) 
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I have two replies. (1) Like perdurantists, endurantists are free to say both (a) that persisting objects 
do not move through spacetime and (b) that all persisting objects ‘exist atemporally at their spatio-
temporal locations’.  (But even if endurantists did differ from perdurantists with regard to (a) and 
(b), it is unclear how this fact would support the Asymmetry Thesis.) 
First consider (a). Endurantists need not say that persisting objects move through 
spacetime; and in fact they have good reasons not to say this. Change of position in a manifold M 
is always change of position in M with respect to some temporal dimension T, where T is separate 
from M. Hence there can be no motion through spacetime, since (presumably) there is no temporal 
dimension separate from the four dimensions of spacetime. 
 Now consider (b). Like the perdurantist, the endurantist is free to say that all objects ‘exist 
atemporally at their spatio-temporal locations’. What distinguishes enduring objects from perduring 
objects is not the ‘manner’ in which they exist at their locations, but the number of locations that 
they have. Each perduring object has exactly one complete location, one region that exactly 
contains the whole of the given object. (The region in question is just the given object’s complete 
worldline.) Perduring objects, in other words, are singly located in spacetime. Enduring objects, on 
the other hand, are multiply located: each of them has many complete locations, many regions that 
exactly contain the whole of the given object. But each of these locations is had simpliciter or 
atemporally, not merely at some moment of the given object’s proper time. Or so the endurantist is 
apparently free to say.  
(2) I turn now to my second reply to the above passages. One of Balashov’s main points in 
those passages seems to be this: whereas the endurantist must take facts about coexistence to 
involve a form of temporal or spatiotemporal modification, the perdurantist need not. The 
perdurantist can take all facts about coexistence to have the following form: O coexists simpliciter 
with O*. The endurantist, on the other hand, should take all facts about coexistence to have one of 
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the following forms, where ‘p’ and ‘p*’ range over times or spacetime points or regions: (i) O 
coexists at p with O*, or (ii) O, at p, coexists with O*, at p*.  
Given the complexity of the debates over the semantics and metaphysics of temporal 
modification, here is not the place to refine or evaluate the foregoing point.16 Instead, I will simply 
concede it to Balashov, unrefined: for the endurantist, all coexistence is coexistence at; and for the 
perdurantist, all coexistence is coexistence simpliciter.   
Initially, this point may seem to lend a certain amount of support to the Asymmetry Thesis. 
For it entails that, contrary to what I claimed earlier, perdurantists can accept Premises 1 and 2 and 
principle (4.1) without thereby incurring a commitment to claims of the form ‘For O at p, O* and 
O** are still or already in existence’. Here is (4.1): 
For object O at point p, there is a sense in which both object O* and object O** are still or 
already in existence iff (i) O is wholly present at p, and (ii) O coexists at p with O* and 
O**. 
 
Return to the case of Jim the temporal part located at point pB. Earlier I said that Jim coexists at pB 
with both Aristotle and Clinton. Together with (4.1), this gave rise to a claim of form STILL. In 
light of the point that I have just conceded to Balashov, however, I can no longer say that Jim 
coexists at pB with Aristotle and Clinton; instead, I must say that Jim coexists simpliciter with 
Aristotle and Clinton. But this cannot be combined with (4.1) to yield a claim of form STILL. Thus 
it may once again seem that the perdurantist has managed to avoid a commitment to the sorts of 
claims in question, hence that the Asymmetry Thesis has been vindicated. 
 In letter, perhaps this thesis has been vindicated. Effectively, however, it remains 
unsupported. To see what I mean by this, consider the following principle: 
(4.1*) For object O (simpliciter), there is a sense in which both object O* and object O** 
are still or already in existence iff (i) O is wholly present at some point, and (ii) O 
coexists (simpliciter) with both O* and O**. 
 
From (4.1*), together with Premises 1 and 2 and perdurantism, it follows that: 
STILL* Aristotle’s death lies within the absolute past of Clinton’s birth, hence 
Aristotle and Clinton never coexist. But for Jim (simpliciter), there is a 
sense in which both Aristotle and Clinton are still or already in existence. 
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Any plausibility that attaches to (4.1) should also attach to (4.1*). If Bob’s coexisting at pB with 
Aristotle and Clinton forces us to conclude that these two men both still or already exist for Bob at 
pB, then Jim’s coexisting simpliciter with Aristotle and Clinton forces us to conclude that they both 
still or already exist for Jim simpliciter. But if the former conclusion conflicts with the historical 
fact that Clinton never coexists with Aristotle, then so does the latter. If claims of form STILL are 
unacceptable, then so are claims like STILL*.  
Thus the outcome of our concession to Balashov is just this. The perdurantist exchanges 
commitments of one sort for commitments of a second sort, where those of the second sort are no 
less troubling than those of the first. No relevant asymmetry between endurantism and 
perdurantism has been established.  
 In the absence of any reason to accept such an asymmetry, we should reject it. Recall 
Balashov’s way of framing the asymmetry:  
If I am an enduring object fully present at a particular [point on my worldline], there is a sense in 
which some other transient enduring objects . . . are still or already in existence (Gorbachev) – 
because they do coexist* with me-now. (2000b: 150, Balashov’s emphasis) 
 
If I am a perduring object . . . there is no sense in which some other perduring objects are ‘still’ [or 
‘already’] in existence. (2000b: 153, Balashov’s emphasis) 
    
This last claim is too strong. It is just an undeniable fact that there is at least some weak sense in 
which George W. Bush is still or already in existence for me at the current point on my worldline. 
Insofar as perdurantism can be taken seriously, it must be consistent with such facts. And it is 
consistent with them. I take it that the following definition captures one perfectly legitimate sense 
of the expression in question: 
For object O at point p, object O* is still or already in existence =df O has a temporal part, 
Op, that is wholly present at p, and Op coexists (simpliciter) with O*. 
  
Thus, even if I am a perduring object, there is at least some weak sense in which Bush is still or 
already in existence for me at the current point on my worldline. Similarly, if Premises 1 and 2 are 
true, and the occupant of point pB coexists with both Aristotle and Clinton, then the following is 
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undeniable: even if Bob is a perduring object, there is at least some weak sense in which both 
Aristotle and Clinton are still or already in existence for Bob at pB. Since the Asymmetry Thesis 
would force us deny the undeniable, that thesis must be rejected. It follows that the endurantist and 
the perdurantist are on equal footing with respect to the sorts of problems that Balashov poses for 
the former. If these problems are fatal for the endurantist, then they are fatal for the perdurantist as 
well; and if they are non-fatal for the perdurantist, they are non-fatal for the endurantist.  
    
5. Coexistence As Spacelike Separation 
If the criticisms made in §4 are correct, then the Asymmetry Thesis is false, and consequently 
Balashov’s argument as a whole is unsound. Even if these criticisms are incorrect, however, 
Balashov’s argument fails anyway, since CASS is false. Or so I intend to show. 
 Before I make any really substantive objections to CASS, I would like to take note of one 
relatively minor and easily corrected problem with it. Suppose that two enduring particles collide at 
a single spacetime point. Presumably they do coexist at the place and time of their collision; 
indeed, the alternative is unintelligible. According to CASS, however, these objects do not coexist 
at the point of their collision, since at that point their separation is null (lightlike), not spacelike as 
(CE*) requires. A version of the this objection applies to (CP). Suppose that I am a perduring 
object (and am spatially unextended, in accordance with Balashov’s assumption). Then surely I 
coexist with my ‘full-grown adult’ temporal part, which is itself a perduring object. But according 
to (CP) I do not so coexist, since no point on the worldline of my full-grown adult temporal part is 
spacelike separated from any point on my worldline. The underlying problem can be expressed 
even more simply by noting that, contrary to (CE*), (CP), and (CP*), coexistence is reflexive: 
everything coexists with itself (simpliciter, or at a given point).  
The necessary remedy is to find a relation other than spacelike separation to serve as the 
basis of coexistence. The obvious candidate for this role is the relation of spacelike-separation-or-
identity between spacetime points. Although our colliding particles are not spacelike separated at 
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the moment of their collision, they do occupy the very same spacetime point. As a result, our 
revised account treats these particles as coexisting, as it should. Similarly for the case of 
overlapping perduring objects. This revision obviously handles the other counterexamples as well. 
Henceforth I shall speak as though Balashov had incorporated this revision into his original 
proposal.   
 On to larger issues. Balashov insists that any acceptable account of coexistence in a 
relativistic context must satisfy each of the following adequacy constraints:17  
Symmetricity:  It must turn out that coexistence is a symmetric relation. 
 
Objectivity:  It must turn out that “given two objects (or their momentary parts . . .) having 
particular locations in spacetime, there [is always] a fact of the matter about their 
coexistence.” (2000c: S553) 
 
Relevance:  It must turn out that the coexistence of any two objects is relevant to their being 
temporally co-located (or ‘co-present’) with one another. 
 
Balashov’s argument for CASS amounts to the following: (1) CASS satisfies each of the foregoing 
constraints, and (2) CASS is the best account of coexistence in a relativistic context that satisfies 
those constraints. 
 I concede both (1) and (2). Nevertheless, I reject CASS. I reject it in favor of the following 
account of coexistence: 
REL Coexistence is relative to a hyperplane of simultaneity (to a plane).18 For any 
objects O and O* and any plane t, O and O* coexist at t iff O’s worldline intersects 
t and O*’s worldline intersects t. 
 
I admit that REL is at a disadvantage to CASS in certain respects. All things considered, however, I 
take REL to be the superior account of coexistence.  
 Let me begin with REL’s main disadvantage. Unlike CASS, REL violates the Objectivity 
constraint. Suppose that you are wholly present at the spacetime point pB. Do you coexist with 
Aristotle at the moment of his death? According to CASS, the answer is a definite ‘Yes’, since pB is 
spacelike separated from Aristotle’s death. According to REL, on the other hand, there is no 
objective or absolute fact of the matter: at some planes of simultaneity you do coexist with the 
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dying Aristotle, and at others you do not. So REL is exactly the sort of account that the Objectivity 
constraint is meant to forbid. 
 Does this by itself constitute a sufficient reason for rejecting REL? Not unless coexistence 
has genuine ontological implications. Suppose for example, that I were committed to a two-way 
link between what exists and what coexists with me. In that case, the relativity of coexistence would 
force me to accept the relativity of existence. If I occupied some distant part of the universe and as 
a result it were a relative matter whether or not Aristotle coexisted with me, I would be forced to 
conclude that it was a relative matter whether or not Aristotle existed. And it would be genuinely 
upsetting, and perhaps outright absurd, to think that existence was a relative rather than an 
objective matter.19  
This problem disappears when we adopt a tenseless, eternalist conception of time. 
(Balashov assumes (i) that SR entails such a conception and (ii) that this conception by itself poses 
no threat to endurantism; see note 8.) Eternalism, recall, is the view that past, present, and future 
entities are all equally real, all equally in existence. As an eternalist, you must admit that there exist 
many things that do not coexist with you. Thus, even if it is relative matter whether Aristotle 
coexists with you, it remains a non-relative, objective fact that Aristotle exists. So, given 
eternalism, the relativity of coexistence encoded in REL does not yield the troubling result that 
what there is is relative. As eternalists, then, we ought to agree that REL’s violation of the 
Objectivity constraint does not by itself constitute a sufficient reason to reject REL. 
One point deserves emphasis here. Although the eternalist holds that past, present, and 
future entities are all equally in existence, she does not hold that all such entities are still or already 
in existence. To say that a given object is still or already in existence is to do more than ascribe a 
robust ontological status to the object: in addition, it is to say something about the object’s 
temporal location; it is, so to speak, to say that the object is ‘temporally here’. Thus, as Balashov 
notes (at, e.g., 2000b: 163, note 23), the eternalist can say: “All past, present, and future objects are 
equally in existence: they all have the same robust ontological status; they all belong to the domain 
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of quantification. But there is a sense in which some of these objects are no longer in existence, 
some are still or already in existence, and some are not yet in existence: some of them are 
‘temporally elsewhere’, and some are ‘temporally here’.” (The foregoing words are mine.) 
For the eternalist, then, the situation is this. There is a deep rift between the ontological 
notion of existence, on one side, and the locative notions of coexistence, temporal ‘here-ness’, and 
being still or already in existence, on the other side. Although genuine ontological relativity would 
be troubling, the relativity of coexistence does not entail it. And although the relativity of 
coexistence would probably entail the relativity of temporal ‘here-ness’ and the relativity of what is 
still or already in existence, these latter two sorts of relativity are not especially troubling. At 
worst, they are initially counterintuitive.       
 Having acknowledged one respect in which REL is at a disadvantage to CASS, and having 
shown that this disadvantage is far from being decisive on its own, I turn to the advantages that 
REL has over CASS. I can think of four.  
  First advantage. Unlike CASS, REL makes coexistence a transitive relation, in the sense 
that for any objects A, B, and C, and any plane t, if A coexists at t with B, and B coexists at t with 
C, then A coexists at t with C. According to CASS, on the other hand, coexistence is grounded in 
spacelike separation, and as a result the former inherits the non-transitivity of the latter. Thus, if 
CASS is true, there is no sense in which coexistence is transitive. Balashov admits that CASS is 
deficient in this respect. (2000b: 140)  
 Second advantage. It seems that REL is just a natural extension of the fact that simultaneity 
itself is a relative matter. It cannot be denied that there is a tight connection between the notion of 
coexistence and the notion of simultaneity. Indeed, the following principle comes about as close to 
being a conceptual truth concerning coexistence as anything I can imagine: 
SIM Suppose that object O and event e are both wholly present at spacetime point p, 
and suppose that object O* and event e* are both wholly present at spacetime point 
p*. Then the coexistence of O and O* has the same status as the simultaneity of e 
and e*: O and O* coexist just in case e and e* are simultaneous; and the 
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coexistence of O and O* is a relative matter just in case the simultaneity of e and 
e* is a relative matter. 
 
In other words, it seems that our treatment of coexistence in a given context ought to run parallel to 
our treatment of simultaneity in the given context. And in particular, it seems that if simultaneity is 
best construed as being a relative matter in a given context, then so is coexistence. 
 In the context of Minkowski spacetime, of course, simultaneity is best construed as being a 
relative matter. Given a particular event e, we do not say that e is absolutely simultaneous with 
every event in e’s topological present. Rather, we say that for any event e* in e’s topological 
present, e and e* are simultaneous with respect to some reference frames but are non-simultaneous 
with respect to other reference frames. Now suppose that objects O and O* are wholly present at 
events e and e*, respectively. Although the simultaneity of e and e* is a relative matter, Balashov 
would have us say that the coexistence of O and O* is an objective matter; he would have us say 
that O and O* coexist not merely relative to a reference frame or a hyperplane of simultaneity, but 
absolutely. According to REL, on the other hand, the coexistence of O and O*, like the 
simultaneity of e and e*, is a relative matter. Thus, insofar as REL respects the highly plausible 
principle SIM whereas CASS violates it, we have a powerful reason for preferring REL to CASS.    
 Third advantage. REL is simpler than CASS. As we saw at the beginning of this section, 
Balashov’s original version of CASS, though pure and simple, is vulnerable to decisive 
counterexamples involving colliding particles, overlapping perduring objects, and the reflexivity of 
coexistence. To handle these examples, we were forced to adulterate and thereby complicate 
Balashov’s original account. Whereas Balashov originally had the natural, non-disjunctive relation 
of spacelike separation serving as the basis for coexistence, we were forced to use the unnatural, 
disjunctive relation of spacelike-separation-or-identity between spacetime points as the new basis 
for coexistence. This, it seems to me, makes the revised version of CASS more complicated than 
REL. 
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 Fourth advantage. This is an advantage that will be recognized as such by endurantists but 
not obviously by perdurantists. From a purely formal or structural point of view, REL demands a 
less radical departure from our ordinary notion of coexistence than does CASS. Our ordinary 
notion of coexistence is a temporally modified notion; it is the notion of coexistence at a time. In 
this sense, the ordinary notion is triadic: it is the notion of a relation that holds between two objects 
at a time. (On temporal modification, see note 16.) The same is true of the notion of coexistence 
defined by REL. Although it is spatiotemporally rather than temporally modified, this notion is 
triadic in just the same way as is the ordinary notion: it is the notion of a relation that holds 
between two objects at a plane. According to CASS, on the other hand, the endurantist notion of 
coexistence is not triadic in this way; rather, it is quadradic: it is the notion of a relation that holds 
between one object at a point on its worldline, and a second object at a point on its worldline. So if 
you are an endurantist, then, to the extent that you want to minimize revisions in the formal 
character of your notion of coexistence, you should prefer REL to CASS. (It is unclear that the 
perdurantist should be moved by this point because it is unclear what he ought to say about the ‘–
adicity’ of the coexistence relation, either as ordinarily conceived, or as specified by CASS.) 
I conclude that REL is superior to CASS as an account of coexistence in Minkowski 
spacetime. This conclusion is of no use, however, unless it provides us with an independent 
solution to the problem that Balashov poses for the endurantist. To see that it does provide such a 
solution, suppose that you are wholly present at the spacetime point pB. Then, according to CASS, 
there is a sense in which you coexist at pB with both Aristotle and Clinton: you are wholly present 
at pB, and both Aristotle and Clinton have worldlines that intersect the topological present of pB. 
This, together with the a highly plausible principle, yields the potentially troubling conclusion that 
for you at pB, there is a sense in which both Aristotle and Clinton are still or already in existence. 
The principle in question is:  
(5.1) If there is a sense in which O coexists at p with both O* and O**, then there is a 
corresponding sense in which both O* and O** are still or already in existence for 
O at p. 
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Now suppose that that REL is true. Suppose also (i) that the plane tA intersects both pB and some 
point on Aristotle’s worldline, and (ii) that the plane tC intersects both pB and some point on 
Clinton’s worldline. Then there is a sense in which you coexist at pB with Aristotle: you and 
Aristotle coexist at tA, and tA intersects pB. Correspondingly, there is a sense in which Aristotle is 
still or already in existence for you at pB. A parallel line of thought leads to the conclusion that 
there is a sense in which Clinton is still or already in existence for you at pB.  
But since there is no single plane at which you coexist with both Aristotle and Clinton, 
there is no sense in which you coexist at pB with both Aristotle and Clinton. Consequently, we face 
no pressure whatsoever to conclude that there is any sense in which both Aristotle and Clinton are 
still or already in existence for you at pB.   
Instead, the following conclusions become overwhelmingly attractive. There is one sense 
in which Aristotle is still or already in existence for you at pB, and there is another sense in which 
Clinton is still or already in existence for you at pB. But there is no sense in which both Clinton and 
Aristotle are still or already in existence for you at pB. Thus the endurantist who accepts Premises 1 
and 3 need not reject the plausible principle (5.1) in order to avoid a commitment to the sorts of 
conclusions that Balashov takes to be so troubling. He can avoid such a commitment simply by 
abandoning CASS in favor of REL. Perhaps the endurantist can count this as an additional reason 
for preferring the latter to the former.  
 
6. Conclusion 
I have attempted to show that there are at least two fatal flaws in Balashov’s ‘coexistence’ 
argument for the incompatibility of endurantism and special relativity. I have not attempted to 
show that there are fatal flaws in every extant argument for this incompatibilist conclusion; still less 
have I attempted to cast doubt on the conclusion itself. I do, however, take myself to be entitled to 
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this much: so far as Balashov’s coexistence argument is concerned, the friend of four-dimensional 
Minkowski spacetime is free to be a ‘three-dimensionalist’ about persisting material objects.20 
                                                          
1
 Quine 1960, Smart 1972, Armstrong 1980. For opposition to this claim, see Mellor 1981, Simons 1987, 
Oderberg 1993, and Rea 1998.  
2
 Balashov has proposed two quite different arguments for the conclusion that endurantism is untenable in 
Minkowski spacetime. The one that I address here focuses on the notion of coexistence. The second (1999 
and 2000a) stems from considerations pertaining to spatial extension. For a critical discussion of the second 
argument, see Sider 2001.   
3
 Balashov proposes these formulations implicitly at 2000b: 129-130, 161 and more explicitly at 2000c: 
S551, S553. 
4
 See, e.g., Putnam 1967, Savitt 2000, and Sider 2001. 
5
 See, e.g., Carter and Hestevold 1994 and Merricks 1995. 
6
 Proponents of the tensed (or dynamic or A-) theory of time typically hold that events instantiate transient, 
monadic ‘A-properties’ such as pastness, presentness, and futurity. Proponents of the rival tenseless theory 
reject A-properties and content themselves with the claim that events stand in unchanging, dyadic relations 
such as earlier than and later than.  
7
 Those who take endurantism to be compatible with both eternalism and the tenseless theory include Wilson 
1955, Mellor 1981 and 1998, Butterfield 1985, Johnston 1987, Haslanger 1989, van Inwagen 1990, Smith 
1993, Rea 1998, Lombard 1999, Lewis 1999 (p. 224), and perhaps Parsons 2000 (whose ‘enduring objects’ 
are temporally extended but lacking in temporal parts). 
 
8
 Although he sometimes suggests otherwise, Balashov clearly believes that endurantists need not be 
presentists or tensers of any kind. Here he explicitly rejects the link between endurantism and presentism:  
The denial of presentism does not . . . entail the four-dimensional ontology of objects. I will not argue here 
against the link between the denial of presentism and perdurantism . . . but will simply assume that no such link 
exists and, hence, that independent arguments are needed to demonstrate that SR requires perdurantism and 
undermines endurantism – the arguments I offer. (2000b: 163, Balashov’s emphasis) 
And in a separate but contemporaneous paper, Balashov explicitly rejects the link between endurantism and 
the tensed theory: 
The belief in the 4D world of events [i.e., in Minkowski spacetime], as here understood, is arguably 
incompatible with a certain view of time known as ‘A-theory of time’ or ‘dynamic time’. The most radical 
version of this view is presentism, the idea that only the present exists. It has recently been intimated that the 
3D ontology of objects (i.e. endurantism) entails A-theory of time or even presentism and is inconsistent with 
the opposite, B-theory of time, or “static time” – the time of modern physics. If this is so, sophisticated [B-
theoretic, relativistic] endurantism, my principal target in this essay, may be a non-starter. 
Although I believe that arguments for the link between endurantism and “dynamic time” are unsound, 
I do not consider the issue in the present paper. Instead, I assume that there is no link and, hence, the 
combination of endurantism with realism about 4D Minkowski world of events is [at least prima facie] a 
tenable one. (1999: 461) 
9
 Balashov: “Two perduring objects [P1 and P2] coexist iff they have spacelike separated parts: CP(P1,P2) 
↔ ∃P1O1∃P2O2(P1O1∈P1 & P2O2∈P2 & R(O1,O2)).” (2000c: S555) 
10
 Balashov: “Two parts of perduring objects coexist iff their locations are spacelike separated: 
CP1(P1O1,P2O2) ↔ R(O1,O2).” (2000c: S555) Elsewhere Balashov explains his notation: “Here ‘P1O1’ and 
‘P2O2’ denote momentary spatiotemporal parts of two perduring objects P1 and P2 located at [spacetime 
points] O1 and O2 respectively.” (S554, my emphasis) 
11
 Balashov: “A perduring object P1 coexists-P* with the O1 part of another perduring object P2 iff P2 has a 
part located at a point O2 spacelike separated from O1.” (2000b: 152) 
12
 Balashov: “Two enduring objects [E1 and E2] coexist [stand in relation CE*] iff their locations [O1 and 
O2] are spacelike separated [stand in relation R]: CE*(E1O1,E2O2) ↔ R(O1,O2).” On the notation: “Here 
‘E1O1’ and ‘E2O2’ denote enduring objects E1 and E2 located at [spacetime points] O1 and O2 respectively.” 
(2000c: S554) 
13
 Balashov: “An enduring object E2 coexists* with E1 fully present at O1 just in case there is a point O2 
such that E2 is fully present at O2 and O2 is spacelike separated from O1.” (2000b: 148) 
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14
 In correspondence, Balashov has denied that his case for the Absurdity Thesis presupposes (3.1). Without 
this principle, however, the Absurdity Thesis seems entirely unsupported.   
15
 The topological present (also known as the ‘absolute elsewhere’) of a spacetime point p is the region 
consisting of exactly those points that are spacelike separated from p. 
16
 For the standard options on change and temporal modification, see Mellor 1981, Lewis 1999 (pp. 187-195), 
Johnston 1987, van Inwagen 1990, and Hinchliff 1996. For some non-standard options, see Mellor 1998, 
Parsons 2000, and Macbride 2001. 
17
 Balashov 2000b: 133 and 2000c: S552-S553.  
18
 An alternative, and perhaps equally good, account of coexistence can be obtained by replacing ‘hyperplane 
of simultaneity’ with ‘Cauchy surface’. Intuitively, a Cauchy surface is a complete spacelike hypersurface 
extending throughout the spacetime in question. Savitt 2000 defines a Cauchy surface as an achronal set of 
spacetime points such that “every timelike or lightlike curve without end intersects the surface exactly once” 
(p. S571). A set S of spacetime points is achronal iff, for each pair ‹p, p*› of members of S, p and p* are 
spacelike separated. The Cauchy-version of REL has the same main virtues and vices as the original. A 
hyperplane of simultaneity is just a Cauchy surface whose constituent points are mutually simultaneous in 
some inertial reference frame. 
19
 Gödel 1949, Yourgrau 1999, but see also Sklar 1981. 
20
 Thanks to Mark Johnston and Steve Weinstein for conversations on related topics, and to Yuri Balashov 
and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Parts of this paper were written with support from a 
Princeton University Graduate Fellowship, which I gratefully acknowledge.  
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